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1. Introduction 
 
Policymakers and corporate representatives have frequently discussed cybersecurity information 
sharing as if it were a panacea. The phrase itself refers to many different activities and types of 
exchanges, but from about 2009 to the end of 2015, the cybersecurity policy debate in 
Washington was dominated by calls for greater information sharing. 1 Influenced in part by the 
post-9/11 theme of “connecting the dots,” both policymakers and the private sector commonly 
accepted that improved cybersecurity depended on—and would flow inexorably from—
expanded information sharing within the private sector and between the private sector and the 
federal government.2 This view seemed to rest upon the assumption that with more information, 
systems may be made more secure through prevention measures or rapid remediation. 
Policymakers, reluctant to regulate cybersecurity standards, viewed voluntary information 
sharing as a tangible coordination activity that could be incentivized through policy intervention 
and sometimes directly facilitated by federal government roles.3 The policy debate culminated 
with the 2015 passage of the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA).4 The law sought to 
encourage information sharing by the private sector by alleviating concerns about liability for 
sharing otherwise legally restricted information. It also sought to improve sharing within the 
federal government and between the government and the private sector. 
 CISA was debated and adopted after several decades of efforts within law enforcement 
and national security agencies to coordinate and increase information sharing with and within the 
private sector. The US Secret Service (USSS) established the New York Electronic Crimes Task 
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Force (ECTF) in 1995 to facilitate information exchanges among the private sector, local and 
national law enforcement, and academic researchers. In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act mandated 
that the USSS create a nationwide network of ECTFs, which eventually consisted of over 39 
regional hubs.5 In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) authorized the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to create a National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) as a 
focal point for gathering and disseminating threat information both within the government and 
with the private sector.6  PDD-63 simultaneously directed the national coordinator for 
infrastructure protection to encourage the private sector to create an Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center (ISAC).7 The role of the private sector center was to collect and analyze private 
sector information to share with the government through the NIPC, but also to combine both 
private sector information and federal information and relay it back out to industry.8 Although 
PDD-63 anticipated that there would be one national ISAC, various sectors ultimately formed 
their own ISACs focused on industry-specific security needs.9  
 Over time, additional federal agencies also developed their own information sharing 
systems and procedures. For instance, US-CERT (US Computer Emergency Readiness Team)—
an organization that took over many of NIPC’s functions after it was dissolved following a 
transfer to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—releases vulnerability information and 
facilitates response to particular incidents. Various other information exchanges and feeds—each 
with its own scope, access policies, and rules—were established across federal agencies charged 
with securing aspects of cyberspace. For example, in 2001 the FBI formally announced its 
“InfraGard” project, designed to expand direct contacts with private sector infrastructure owners 
and operators, as well as to share information about cyber intrusions, exploited vulnerabilities, 
and infrastructure threats.10  
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 In addition to these piecemeal federal efforts to expand cyber information sharing, private 
sector information sharing arrangements also proliferated. Antivirus software companies agreed 
to share virus signatures with each other, essentially deciding to differentiate themselves on 
platform usability and support instead of competing for data.11  Additionally, security researchers 
and individual corporate professionals formed ad hoc arrangements around critical responses to 
major incidents such as the Conficker worm and the Zeus botnet—threats that required 
coordination of response as well as exchange of information.12 
 Consequently, even before CISA was enacted, an ecosystem of information exchanges, 
platforms, organizations, and ad hoc groups had arisen to respond to increasingly pervasive and 
complex security threats within all industries. Today, this ecosystem of information sharing 
networks is characterized by a high degree of diversity—the result of years of evolving policies 
and cooperative models, driven by both the federal government and private sector. Information 
sharing models and structures operate in different niches—working sometimes in silos, 
occasionally duplicating efforts, and sometimes complementing each other.13   
 CISA attempted to advance information sharing on four dimensions: within the private 
sector, within the federal government, from the private sector to the government, and from the 
government to the private sector. However, the legislation was enacted without first fully 
mapping the ecosystem that had developed in the preceding years. Little effort was made to 
identify what was working effectively and why, or to de-conflict existing federal programs. 
Instead, the private sector repeatedly stated—and policymakers accepted—that concerns over 
legal liability (mainly arising, it was asserted, from privacy laws) were inhibiting information 
sharing. Therefore, one of CISA’s major provisions was liability protection for private sector 
organizations as an incentive for more information sharing.  
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 CISA’s usefulness and impact on the information sharing ecosystem has yet to be 
demonstrated. To the contrary, our study suggests that the law did little to improve the state of 
information sharing. If anything, it only added more hurdles to federal efforts by mandating that 
the federal portal include unnecessary technical details (free field text entry) and cumbersome 
submission methods (email). The law lacked specificity on how federal efforts would work with 
each other and with already existing information sharing networks in the private sector. Focusing 
almost solely on the private sector’s liability concerns, it failed to address other key factors 
associated with sharing, including trust management, incentives, reciprocation, and quality 
control. In sum, CISA was a policy intervention divorced from existing sharing mechanisms and 
lacking a nuanced view of important factors that could enable agile exchanges of actionable 
information.  
 This paper focuses on cybersecurity information within the private sector and between 
the private sector and federal government (leaving to others the issue of sharing within the 
federal government itself). It examines how governance structures, roles, and associated policies 
within different cybersecurity information sharing organizations impact what information is 
shared (and with whom) and the usefulness of the information exchanged. This research is based 
on a qualitative analysis of 16 semi-structured interviews with cybersecurity practitioners and 
experts. Using these interviews and other available information on cybersecurity sharing, we 
have created a taxonomy of governance structures that maps the ecosystem of information 
sharing organizations—each of which fills particular security needs and is enabled by different 
policy structures. This paper discusses the implications of these policies and structures for values 
that directly impact sharing, particularly the tradeoff between trust and scalability. This research 
illustrates how different governance models may result in different degrees of success within the 
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complex and changing cybersecurity ecosystem. Our findings point to lessons—mainly 
cautionary ones—for policymakers seeking to encourage improvements in cybersecurity. This 
paper focuses on information sharing within the United States, but given the multinational nature 
of many private sector companies, some findings may be relevant internationally.  
 The types of cybersecurity-related information that could be shared to improve 
cybersecurity defenses and incident response include incidents (including attack methods), best 
practices, tactical indicators, vulnerabilities, and defensive measures. Generally, the 
organizations we describe in this paper are engaged in sharing tactical indicators, often called 
“indictors of compromise” (IOCs). An IOC can be defined as an artifact that relates to a 
particular security incident or attack. IOCs may be filenames, hashes, IP addresses, hostnames, 
or a wide range of other information. Cybersecurity defenders may use IOCs forensically to 
identify the compromise or defensively to prevent it.14  
 
2. Taxonomy of Information Sharing Governance Structures and Policies  
 
Over time, different cybersecurity information sharing structures have arisen to address 
particular needs or challenges. Given the wide range of information types, federal roles, industry 
sectors, and information sensitivities at issue, it is perhaps inevitable that an array of information 
arrangements has formed, each serving particular perceived needs, each with its own priorities 
and challenges, and each with its own respective membership policies and governance structures. 
Our research identified at least seven information sharing models: 
1) Government-centric 
2) Government-prompted, industry-centric 
3) Corporate-initiated, peer-based (organizational level) 
4) Small, highly vetted, individual-based groups 
5) Open-source sharing platforms 
6) Proprietary products 
7) Commercialized services  
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To understand these governance models, our taxonomy articulates different policy and 
organizational approaches to sharing, as well as their impact on mission, participation, 
risk/benefit tradeoffs, and efficacy. 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of Information Sharing Models 
Classification Organizational 
Units 
Example 
Organizations 
Governance types 
 
Government-centric Government operated; private-
sector members can be 
corporations, private sector 
associations (e.g., ISACs), 
nonprofits (e.g., universities), 
or individuals  
DHS AIS; US-CERT; 
ECTF; FBI’s e-guardian; 
ECS 
Federal laws and policies; 
voluntary participation;  
rules range from open 
sharing subject to traffic 
light protocol or FOUO (for 
official use only) to 
classified information 
restrictions (ECS) 
Government-prompted, 
industry-centric 
 
Sector or problem specific ISACs; ISAOs Sector or problem specific; 
voluntary participation; 
generally organized as non-
profits, use terms of service 
or other contractual methods 
to enforce limits on 
redisclosure of information 
Corporate-initiated, peer-based 
(organizational level) 
 
Specific private companies  Facebook ThreatExchange; 
Cyber Threat Alliance 
Reciprocal sharing; closed 
membership; information 
controlled by contract (e.g., 
ThreatExchange Terms and 
Conditions) 
Small, highly vetted, 
individual-based groups 
 
Individuals join, take 
membership with them through 
different jobs 
OpSec Trust; secretive, ad-
hoc groups 
Trust based upon personal 
relationships and vetting of 
members; membership and 
conduct rules  
Open-source sharing platforms 
 
 Spamhaus Project Information published and 
open to all; no membership 
but may be formed around 
community of active 
contributors and 
information users; one 
organization may manage 
platform infrastructure  
Proprietary products 
 
Organization or individuals 
participate by purchasing the 
product 
AV and firewall vendors Information via paid 
interface; responsibility and 
security management still in 
house 
Commercialized services Organizations purchase service Managed Security Service 
Providers 
Outsourcing of security  
 
 
 
2.1 Government-centric Sharing Models 
 
The cybersecurity policy of the US federal government is simultaneously oriented towards many 
different goals, ranging from national security, to protecting federal IT systems, to investigating 
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and punishing cybercrime. with the overarching goal of ensuring a healthy and productive US 
economy through the protection of American critical infrastructures and intellectual property. 
Each goal results in different information sharing priorities.15 Given the number of federal 
agencies involved in some aspect of cybersecurity, the growth of information sharing systems is 
not surprising—even if it is frustrating to information consumers. Federal information sharing 
programs range from the FBI’s eGuardian and InfraGard, to DHS’s Automated Information 
Sharing (AIS) program and its narrowly tailored Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) 
program, USSS ECTF alerts, and US-CERT alerts and tips.  
 The role of the federal government in improving cybersecurity may be viewed from a 
public good perspective, whereby federal investment in cybersecurity would adjust for 
underinvestment by individuals and the private sector.16 However, for such public investment to 
be effective would require first an understanding of what the private sector lacks and whether the 
government has what is lacking or could effectively acquire it and make it available in a timely 
fashion. In fact, leaving aside the question of whether the private sector really suffers from a lack 
of cybersecurity information, there are limitations to the federal government’s ability to quickly 
and efficiently share information. Accordingly, there are significant challenges associated with 
expecting the federal government to fulfill a role as central information collector and 
disseminator.  
 Given the network of national security, intelligence, and law enforcement entities, some 
government-held information becomes trapped within classification restrictions, involving 
extensive security standards for personnel, IT networks, and physical facilities, and severely 
limiting recipients and methods of disbursement. The Pentagon’s Defense Industrial Base (DIB) 
cybersecurity program and DHS’s Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program were 
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developed to disseminate such classified data within special security agreements. These 
programs trade limited access for greatly improved information quality. As implemented, they 
appear not to be intended to support dissemination to a wide number of recipients.  Instead, they 
disseminate information to just a handful of communications service providers (AT&T, 
CenturyLink, and Verizon) plus Leidos (formerly SAIC), entities that provide cybersecurity 
services to a multitude of customers and have the capability to ingest and act upon the 
information provided. In contrast, the reach of DHS’s Cyber Information Sharing and 
Collaboration Program (CISCP) is broader (although still restricted), but it focuses on sharing 
analytic products with the private sector and therefore trades speed for context. (CISCP offers a 
range of products, including indicator bulletins intended to support faster action to thwart attacks 
and remediate vulnerabilities.17)  
 At the other end of the spectrum, membership requirements for organizations such as the 
USSS ECTFs are much less strenuous, requiring a referral by someone already in the 
organization. The ECTFs disseminate information mainly by email (and in-person meetings). 
Information shared on the listserv is regulated using the traffic light protocol, where each color 
defines how it may be used and re-disclosed.18 Only the USSS sends information to the ECTF 
listservs, although the information may originate from many different sources.  
 Several interviewees discussed a hesitation after the Snowden revelations to share 
information with any US government agency, regardless of the formal governance mechanisms. 
They cited general cultural unease, as well as fear of negative publicity if and when the sharing 
came to light. One federal employee involved in information sharing commented that “post-
Snowden, and almost certainly now post-WikiLeaks, [getting the private sector to share] is going 
to become more difficult for us. We are battling a lot of perception.” Internationally, for any 
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company subject to European regulation, these cultural and reputational concerns are heightened 
and augmented by the assumption that sharing information with the US government would 
violate the 2016 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
 The regulatory and law enforcement powers of the federal government at times may 
discourage sharing from the private sector. Yet the existence of those powers may also 
incentivize sharing, at least on a case-by-case basis, for they represent capabilities to act against 
cyberthreats in ways not available to the private sector. 19 One cybersecurity practitioner 
commented: “Law enforcement [are] the people who are able to take special action to identify 
and attribute this information to individuals, who have authority to utilize rule of law, court 
orders, subpoenas, everything that’s required essentially to take authoritative action and 
prosecute these individuals. Nothing pulls them [attackers] out of the ecosystem quite as well as 
putting them in jail for their crimes.”  
 Even when legal barriers and the government’s negative reputation are mitigated, sharing 
with the government can be difficult. Interviewees complained that there is a high barrier to 
participation in DHS’s AIS due to the technical requirements for setting up the sharing interface.  
 The fact that the US government’s role in information sharing remains fractured among 
many different agencies—each with its own respective priorities to share inside or outside of the 
government itself—is not necessarily undesirable. It might be effective to have different agencies 
play different roles. However, it is not clear that there is a unified policy or strategy for the 
proliferation of federal information sharing programs with broadly defined and overlapping 
missions. What we see is a failure in both directions: private entities share relatively little 
information with the government, and what information the government shares is outdated or 
otherwise not actionable. Outside of specialized sharing arrangements such as the ECS, there are 
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weak incentives for the private sector to take on the reputational risks and the administrative and 
technical burdens of sending information to the government.  
 Contrasted with the publicly endorsed but not yet realized goal of large-scale, large-
volume sharing arrangements, the most effective reciprocal sharing between the private sector 
and the federal government may occur on an ad hoc basis, founded on personal connections 
between security professional in and out of government and on the unique strengths of particular 
agencies. For example, a national security agency may have the most to offer when an attacker is 
a foreign government, the FBI may have the most to offer when the attack appears to be a 
criminal matter, and the DHS or US CERT may be particularly useful in terms of remediation. In 
some reaches of the cybersecurity community, as one interviewee noted, there is a high crossover 
of personal relationships between “feds” and the private sector—which allows for direct sharing 
and consultation through interpersonal connections, as opposed to automated or systematic 
means. Given current trends, it seems there is a long way to go before the federal government 
could function as a central collector and switching hub for all cybersecurity information. Federal 
information sharing programs could benefit from a more realistic assessment of the federal 
government’s strengths in partnering with, and responding to the needs of, the private sector. 
 
2.2 Government-Prompted, Industry-Centric Sharing Models 
  
As noted above, in 1998, President Bill Clinton directed his national coordinator for security and 
counter-terrorism to consult with owners and operators of critical infrastructure in order to 
encourage them to create “a private sector information sharing and analysis center.” Although 
Clinton’s directive contemplated a single center for all of the private sector, multiple ISACs were 
established over the next two decades, mainly on an industry-specific basis, to serve as collection 
and analysis points for private sector entities to share data on a peer-to-peer basis, to feed 
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information into the federal government, and to provide a channel for federal information to flow 
out to the private sector. Though prompted by federal action, ISACs were intended to be led by 
the private sector. There are currently more than 20 ISACs. Their industry-specific focus seems 
to be based on the assumption that cybersecurity threats are most effectively shared among those 
within a single industry.20  
 In 2015, President Barack Obama encouraged the creation of Information Sharing and 
Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) to supplement the ISACs. This support for ISAOs was based in 
the belief that some companies do not fit neatly within a traditional industry classification.21 
ISAOs have sprung up around a variety of organizing principles, including industry (e.g., legal 
services, sports), region (e.g., Maryland, Southern California, Northeastern Ohio), or problem 
(e.g., Trustworthy Accountability Group (TAG), Cyber Resilience Group).22 
 The Financial Services ISAC (FS-ISAC) is widely cited as the canonical example of a 
successful information sharing arrangement. As of October 2017, it had 7,000 members, 
including commercial banks and credit unions of all sizes.23 In its early days, the FS-ISAC 
benefitted from (among other factors) the financial sector’s having a primary geographic hub, 
within New York City. Mutual dependencies among institutions in the financial services sector 
also helped supply the trust required to kick off the FS-ISAC. “The banks [although] 
competitors, are also counterparties. They know that even though they want to beat the other 
banks, they need them because they’re on the other ends of the trades.” Personal relationships 
between security professionals at the banks engendered trust. The importance of personal 
relations may have helped the FS-ISAC successfully navigate the hurdle of including law 
enforcement participants, by slowly introducing into the exchange “feds” who had existing 
relationships with members.  
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 Trust based on geographic proximity and personal relationships has its limits. For the FS-
ISAC, there may be a tradeoff between size and trust. It was reported in August 2016 that eight 
of the largest banks in the US had formed their own sub-group for cybersecurity information 
sharing and cooperation, one of “a couple dozen” sub-groups within or associated with the FS-
ISAC.24 Other factors associated with maturity may also impact trust. In 2016, the FS-ISAC sold 
its sharing platform, Soltra, to the for-profit NC4 because management had become too 
burdensome for the organization. Some of our interviewees expressed uncertainty about the 
seemingly sudden acquisition of the open-source platform by a proprietary company. Others 
viewed this as a sign of success, indicating that the FS-ISAC had matured to a point where its 
core platform could be commercialized.  
 From a governance perspective, ISACs and ISAOs represent a unique model: federal 
policy prompted their creation, but governance was ceded to voluntary groups of organizations 
facing common cybersecurity threats and sharing common goals. The hands-off, partnership 
model has fostered a network of organizations that responds to the needs and challenges of 
particular sectors, while offering the opportunity to coordinate with the federal government (e.g., 
many ISACs contribute to DHS’s AIS and include law enforcement agencies within their 
membership). ISACs and ISAOs are typically nonprofits that manage membership and activities. 
For example, members of the FS-ISAC apply and pay a membership fee. Membership 
requirements vary by ISAC or ISAO, but the flexibility of the independent governance model 
allows each entity to reflect the needs of its community.25 The National Council of ISACs (NCI) 
coordinates activities between ISACs and has a leadership presence at federal meetings, which 
helps to foster some high level collaboration.26 An ISAO Standards Organization has also been 
set up, as a voluntary standard setting organization that works with information sharing entities 
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on standards, guidelines, and best practices.27 It is hard to assess the effectiveness of the ISACs 
and, even more so, the newer ISAOs. However, the federal government seems to have facilitated 
internal dynamics that allow trust to seed itself by encouraging the process of ISAC and ISAO 
creation but allowing industry to self-govern along sectoral or thematic lines.  
 
2.3 Corporate-Initiated, Peer-Based Groups 
 
Some companies have undertaken on their own initiative and without government intervention to 
coordinate information sharing in order to address particular needs. For example, antivirus 
vendors have agreed to share virus signatures and other indicators of compromise, essentially 
deciding to not compete on the underlying information but on other features of their products.28 
In 2014, these vendors formed the Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). CTA requires that all 
participants contribute threat intelligence daily. It has designed a system that not only exchanges 
fresh indicators of compromise but also fosters discussions about the context for the shared data 
and produces “adversarial playbooks.” Most recently, it has begun automating the delivery and 
configuration of endpoint controls on members’ systems.29 In 2017, CTA became a nonprofit and 
hired leadership to manage its growing network of participants—the same governance model by 
which many ISACs are run.30  
 Facebook’s ThreatExchange also follows the closed membership and required 
participation model. ThreatExchange grew out of Facebook’s efforts to rapidly handle malware 
spam attacks on its site that were also hitting other large internet companies.31 Membership has 
been generally restricted to large peer companies, including Pinterest, Twitter, and Tumblr. 
Unlike ISACs, it is run by Facebook, not by an independent entity.   
 There is an unknown number of other privately-sponsored cybersecurity information 
sharing entities. The Advanced Cyber Security Center (ACSC), for example, was created by 
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Mass Insight, a Boston-based consulting and research firm. ACSC brings together industry 
participants from the health care, energy, defense, financial services, and technology sectors, as 
well as government officials and academics. It is governed by a board of directors and a 
participation agreement, whereby members agree to share sensitive information confidentially.32  
 By orienting around a shared set of problems, these information exchanges can be 
tailored to fit the specific needs of their members (or their creators). As these exchanges appear 
to cater to larger, more established organizations, they may be better able to achieve reciprocity 
in sharing. However, this may leave out smaller companies, which need to find other means to 
secure their networks.  In addition, these organizations may face issues of sustainability. For 
example, as of October 30, 2017, the most recent update to the homepage for Facebook’s 
ThreatExchange was over a year old. 
 
2.4 Small, Highly Vetted, Individual-Based Groups 
Cybersecurity professionals have formed small, highly vetted online communities of peers to 
share sensitive, actionable information with the goal of promptly remediating attacks and other 
problems. Membership is held by individuals, not by organizations. These communities function 
largely in secret in order to protect their operations. Operations Security Trust is one example. Its 
skeletal website states: “Ops-T does not accept applications for membership. New candidates 
are nominated by their peers who are actively working with them on improving the operational 
robustness, integrity, and security of the Internet.33 Though each group has its own membership 
vetting requirements and community standards, vetting usually involves a personal 
recommendation by a current member. Vetting rules may include restrictions on who can vet 
whom; some groups require that a newcomer have recommendations from individuals who do 
not work for the same employer as the newcomer. An interviewee noted: “Typically, the more 
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vetted ones, they just don’t typically vouch a lot of people that aren’t under outside levels of trust 
already. With those, you may or may not get an invite. Then also, as far as kind of the vouching 
levels go, it may require zero vouches once you’ve been nominated ranging up to two or three 
different individuals who can vouch.” 
 These groups are small by design, for their members require a high degree of trust in 
order to rapidly exchange information about ongoing attacks (which involves some disclosure of 
vulnerabilities), to solicit advice on how to respond, and to share lessons from attacks they have 
experienced (which again may involve some discussion of vulnerabilities) so others may take 
preventative actions. Interviewees stressed the importance of the small size of these 
organizations. For instance, one commented: “The unfortunate thing is the sliding scale, because 
as the groups become larger the pool of people may tend to start to evolve into a less trusting 
relationship because now there’s more fingers in the pie, so to speak. You may not be quite 
aware of who your information is being disseminated to in some cases. More accidental or 
intentional or incidental leaks of information may occur as the constituency grows.” The larger a 
group gets, the less likely it is to share sensitive information. 
 These clandestine and agile groups play an important role in the information ecosystem, 
allowing individuals to communicate quickly and completely with peers to actively mitigate 
incidents and devise preventative measures to protect their networks and systems. To the extent 
that members of these small, highly vetted groups participate in other sharing organizations with 
broader membership, they may help improve the functioning and effectiveness of those 
organizations (e.g., members of one of these small, highly vetted groups may share general 
knowledge with an ISAC or other sharing organization).  
2.5 Open Communities and Platforms 
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Open-source sharing platforms and repositories for cybersecurity data offer a way to 
crowdsource collection, offer easy and unrestricted access to data, and allow for transparency 
and scrutiny of practices. Often associated with researchers (both independent and academic) or 
a host technology company, these platforms are most often focused on a particular type of data 
such as malware signatures or spam IP addresses. Policies about participation and use within 
these platforms and communities are generally liberal, and focused more on the structure and 
format of information shared.  
 Some of these open-source networks are run by nonprofits. The Malware Information 
Sharing Platform (“MISP”) is a free, open-source platform for collecting, storing, and sharing 
cybersecurity indicators, initially developed by researchers from the Computer Incident 
Response Center of Luxembourg, the Belgian military, and NATO. Hail a TAXII.com is a 
repository of open-source cyberthreat intelligence feeds in STIX format, consisting of 817,631 
indicators as of May 15, 2017.34 The Spamhaus Project maintains the famous spam blocking list, 
which includes a Botnet Controller List, and also has an Exploits Block List, a real-time database 
of IP addresses of hijacked PCs infected by illegal third party exploits. Spamhaus disseminates 
intelligence on both a free and subscription basis. 35  There are also publicly available resources 
provided by for-profit entities for free, with various enhancements that users can purchase. For 
example, Snort, owned by Cisco Systems, is an open-source Network Intrusion Prevention 
System (“NIPS”) and Network Intrusion Detection System (“NIDS”) that performs real-time 
traffic analysis and packet-logging.36 An exhaustive description of platforms and repositories that 
could fit within this category of open-sourced material is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is 
important to recognize how the openness and reach of communities like these differentiate them 
from more formal structures.  
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 The governance of open-source initiatives has been widely studied, although it does not 
appear in the context of cybersecurity information sharing.37 In 2012, DHS launched a project on 
open-source cybersecurity solutions, but the effort was not sustained and, in any case, did not 
address information sharing arrangements.38 Hence, trust comes mainly from a belief in the value 
of transparency and the efficacy of the open-source model. 
 
2.6 Proprietary Products and Commercialized Services 
 
By “proprietary products,” we refer to firewalls, antivirus software, and other software products 
that disseminate cybersecurity information through regular updates delivered to nodes or end 
user devices, often with little intervention by the network operator or end user. By 
“commercialized services,” we refer to the wide range of outsourced cybersecurity services that 
use information they collect and analyze from existing information exchanges, from proprietary 
research, and from sensors embedded on customer networks to provide active monitoring and 
management of third-party devices and systems. Commercialized services include managed 
security service providers (MSSPs).  Proprietary products and commercialized services represent 
models where information exchange has been commoditized by the market. Companies offering 
these products and services may participate in any of the other information exchanges, but they 
package and disseminate the information in a way that makes it available to small and medium 
organizations or individuals seeking to improve their security. Thus cybersecurity information 
from other sharing ecosystems reaches consumers or companies who may not have the security 
infrastructure in place to ingest and act on data feeds themselves. Additionally, these products 
and services may collect information from their customers and contribute these data back into the 
information sharing network, thus enlisting in the ecosystem entities that do not have the 
capability to collect or act upon information on their own. 
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 From the end user perspective, proprietary products and commercialized services can be 
black boxes. Customers have no say in governance, and issues of trust are reduced to the single 
question of whether to purchase the product or service and to renew it when the initial contract 
term is up. It can be very hard for end users to make return on investment judgments, especially 
in the face of dynamic change in both the threat environment and the marketplace for these 
products and services. The Cyber Threat Alliance described above, now a nonprofit comprised of 
a dozen commercial entities, provides a form of governance, under which vendors commit to 
pool their intelligence. Ultimately, trade associations or other consortia may develop to offer 
other elements of governance. 
 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
3.1 Trust and the Tradeoffs  
 
The taxonomy of cybersecurity information sharing structures that we developed may help 
illustrate how different design and policy choices result in different information sharing 
outcomes. Based on the governance models described, we identified a set of factors or 
determinants of effectiveness that appear in different cybersecurity information sharing regimes.  
 The central role of trust in information sharing arrangements has been cited by many and 
is fully confirmed by our research.39 Our research has identified one important aspect of trust: 
within cybersecurity information sharing, trust must be bidirectional. By this, we mean that 1) 
the sharing entity needs to trust that the information will not be used against it for regulatory or 
liability purposes, obtained by adversaries and exploited against it as a vulnerability, or disclosed 
publicly to hurt the reputation of the sharer; and 2) the recipient of information needs to trust the 
integrity of the information shared. We also found that success in some models has an additional 
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dimension, which is reciprocity: parties need to trust that other participants will contribute 
roughly equivalent information.  Governance structures and their associated policies may help 
generate these prerequisites by restricting and vetting membership in some capacity, by 
reviewing and verifying information submitted by other members, or by committing all members 
to contribute.  
 In the case of CISA, federal policy attempted to alleviate trust burdens that accompany 
sharing private sector information with the government, by limiting public disclosure through 
FOIA and by offering protections against liability and regulation. However, we found no 
evidence to indicate that CISA has succeeded in encouraging increased cybersecurity 
information sharing.40  While it may be premature to conclude that CISA has been a failure, our 
research highlights some of the limitations of the statute’s approach. By focusing on concerns 
over liability exposure, especially related to privacy laws, CISA failed to take into account other 
issues relevant to the sharing of private sector data with the federal government in a post-
Snowden reality—particularly issues of public perception. Aside from the negative implications 
of sharing with the government, CISA did not account—and perhaps no law could account—for 
companies’ fears about the reputational harm they might incur should their vulnerability become 
publicly known, or their fears about future attacks if vulnerabilities fall into the wrong hands. If 
indeed CISA has failed to induce more cybersecurity information sharing, it may be because it 
did not take into account these foundational elements of trust. 
 Our research points toward a clear tradeoff between membership size and the amount and 
sensitivity of information shared. Governance and policy structures can generate trust by limiting 
membership with some level of vetting and by requiring active participation. These dimensions 
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of trust should be taken as governance design choices that can be worked into any organizational 
structure.  
 
3.2 The Ecosystem and the Role of the Federal Government 
 
The cybersecurity information sharing ecosystem, when considered in its entirety, shows the 
strengths of different components of the system. It is myopic to evaluate all the components of 
the system on the comprehensiveness of the information shared (let alone on timeliness or any 
other single metric). While it is necessary for at least some groups to have more complete or 
sensitive access to information, not every sharing organization in the ecosystem needs to have 
the same level of comprehensiveness or sensitivity. Each of the governing structures should be 
evaluated for success metrics that fit the goals of each model. For instance, by hosting regional, 
face-to-face meetings, ECTFs provide value in the ecosystem of information sharing and should 
not be pressured to be a primary distributor of all possibly relevant information. Ad hoc groups 
of highly vetted individuals, on the other hand, are not in competition with organizational-based 
systems. Nevertheless, overlap between individuals across types of groups can reinforce the 
ecosystem.  
 Proposals that the federal government should be the central collector and distributor of 
cybersecurity information seem unrealistic, if for no other reason than the trust deficit the 
government bears. Even if the government could satisfy the first two tenets of trust, a federally 
dominated exchange would only work if there were reciprocity between the federal government 
and the private sector. Current platforms like DHS AIS are struggling to distribute the 
information, not to mention the challenges brought on by the tradeoff of scalability and 
information comprehensiveness. Given classification concerns with most security-related data, it 
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is unlikely that the federal government would ever achieve a fluid and agile reciprocation of 
information with the private sector.  
 Instead of suggesting the federal government as the central information hub for 
cybersecurity data, our research illustrates that other governing structures can fulfill necessary 
high-trust, high-sensitivity niches in the information exchanges. Certainly programs like CISCP 
and DIB allow the government to act in a way that fosters all the tenets of trust, but these 
programs will never be scalable without losing essential analytical resolution and reciprocity in 
sensitive sharing. Although still unsatisfying, the diverse economy of sharing models that we 
have identified may be, together and separately, the most feasible option.  		
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